1、毕业论文：外文翻译学生姓名： 定稿时间：20xx-xx-xx外文翻译之一LOAN GUARANTEES:COSTS OF DEFAULT AND BENEFITS TO SMALL FIRM作者：ALLAN L. RIDING& GEORGE HAINES JR. 国籍：Canada出处：Carleon University, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada原文正文：Governments of most countries seek to encourage Small and Medium Sized Enterprise (SME) growth and the job
2、creation that many believe is fostered by such growth. Substantive growth usually requires expansion capital. It is often perceived that compared with larger firms, SMEs face disproportionately less access to the debt capital they need for start-up, growth, and survival.Consequently, governments and
3、 trade associations have often intervened in credit markets by taking on the role of guarantor of loans that financial institutions advance to SMEs. For example, the Small Business Administration in the United States provides guarantees of loans made by banks to qualifying small firms. Similar schem
4、es are in effect in, among other countries,Canada, Japan, the U.K., Korea, and Germany. Trade associations take on such roles in France, Spain,and other nations.Loans that support the expansion of small enterprises may convey significant benefits to the borrowing firms and, through job creation and
5、retention, to the rest of society. However, to the extent that some borrowers are unable to meet the repayment obligations of their debt, guarantors also face material real costs of honoring their guarantee to the lenders. Loan guarantee programs are designed in a variety of ways. Often these progra
6、ms do not appear to reflect guidance from economic theory or experience.This paper draws on empirical evidence to compare costs with benefits. In addition, it uses the results and economic theory to provide some guidance for the design of loan guarantee programs. Finally, the study shows that loan g
7、uarantee programs can be an effective means of supporting start-up, growth, and survival of new and risky enterprises. The work finds that substantial total and incremental job creation may be attributed to the Canadian loan guarantee program.The paper reviews previous attempts to conduct cost-benef
8、it analyses of loan guarantee programs.It finds wide variation, internationally, in default rates. Published data suggests default rates vary from less than 5% (Germany) to more than 40% (U.K.). The empirical analysis reported here focuses on the Canadian implementation of loan guarantees, the Small
9、 Business Loans Act (SBLA). Findings include (1) loan guarantees granted under the terms of the SBLA provide an extremely efficient means of job creation, with very low estimated costs per job; (2) default rates are higher for newer firms, increase with the amount of funds borrowed, and vary widely
10、by sector (borrowers in the retail and accommodation, and food and beverage sectors were significantly more likely to default than borrowers in other sectors); and (3) the widening eligibility to larger firms and to larger loans may not be well advised and is inconsistent with the goals of the progr
11、am. Moreover, reducing the loan ceiling would arguably discourage fraudulent applications while servicing those SMEs most in need of early-stage capital.In addition, analysis of the lenders motives suggests that default rates on the portfolio of guaranteed loans and, therefore, the costs of honoring
12、 guarantees, are particularly sensitive to the level of the guarantee. Small reductions in the level of the guarantee (for example, guaranteeing80%of principal and accrued interest instead of 85%) could lead to substantial reductions in default rates. Debate persists in economic theory about whether
13、 or not government intervention in the credit market is warranted, in spite of the findings that loan guarantees seem to make positive contributions. Further analysis of these issues is advised. 2001 Elsevier Science Inc.贷款担保的违约成本和对小企业的利处作者：亚伦.瑞德 乔治.海恩斯国籍：加拿大出处：加拿大.安大略省.渥太华市.carleon大学中文译文：大多数国家的政府鼓励
14、中小企业的成长，并认为中小企业的成长能促进就业机会的增长。中小企业实质性的成长需要资本扩张。通常认为，相对于大企业而言，中小企业面临着不成比例或者说很少能筹集到其发起、成长和生存所需要的债务资本。政府和行业协会常常扮演者信贷担保人的角色以使贷款机构向中小企业发放贷款。例如，在美国，小企业管理局向符合条件的小企业发放银行贷款担保。类似的计划，实际上，在其他国家例如加拿大，日本，英国，韩国和德国都存在。法国、西班牙和其他国家的行业协会也常常扮演着这种角色。支持扩大小企业的贷款，可能会给借款单位带来显著效益；并且能够通过创造新的就业岗位和保留原来的岗位，也会给整个社会带来显著效益。然而，从某种程度上
15、，一些借款人无法履行期借款偿还义务，担保者也面临着向放款者履行地担保义务的物质上的实际成本。贷款担保计划书有各种各样的设计样式。通常，这些计划书的出现并不直接反映经济理论或经验方面的指南。这篇论文是基于实证研究以对比贷款担保的成本和收益。此外，本篇论文使用研究结果和经济理论向贷款计划的设计给以指导。最后，研究表明，贷款担保计划是支持本身具有风险的新型企业发起、存在和生存的有效方式。研究发现，大量的总量和增量的就业岗位的创造可以归因于加拿大的贷款担保计划。这篇论文回顾了以前试图进行的贷款担保计划的陈本收益分析。研究发现，国际范围内，违约率存在着很大差异。公布的数据表明，违约率从不到5%（德国）到
16、超过40%（英国）。据此期间，对重点向加拿大实施的贷款担保和中小企业贷款法的实证分析的结果表明：（1）根据中小企业贷款法，贷款担保提供了一种非常有效的创造就业岗位的方式，并给与创造的每个岗位的成本非常低的估计；（2）新企业的违约可能性更大，并且这种可能性随着借款金额的增加而提高；不同行业的违约率有着显著不同（零售、住宿、食品和饮料行业的借款者的违约率比其他行业借款者的违约率更高。）；（3）扩大交大的企业和交大贷款资格可能并不是合适的建议，并且这也与贷款担保计划的目标不想符合。此外，降低贷款上限无疑将阻止欺诈应用从而向中小企业提供其早期最需要的资本金。此外，对贷款人的动机分析表明担保贷款组合的违
17、约率和履行担保的成本对保证水平特别敏感。保证水平的小幅度减小（例如，保证80%的本金和利息而不是85%的本金和利息）可能导致违约水平的大幅度减小。尽管有发现说明担保贷款似乎做出了积极的贡献，但关于政府干预信贷市场是否是必须的经济理论一直被争论着。进一步分析这些问题变得很有必要。外文翻译之二THE DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE CREDIT INFORMATION DATABASE AND CREDIT GUARANTEE SYSTEM FINAL DRAFT REPORT 作者： Dr. Sharifah Mariam Alhabshi， Mr. Abdullah Azmi
18、 Abd. KhalidProf. Dr. Barjoyai Bardai 国籍： Malaysia出处：University of Malaya 原文正文：1、conclusionFirstly, government efforts toward enhancing the capability and capacity of SMEs as the country growth engine has been remarkable. Continuous multi-types assistance has been introduced for all levels of SMEs.
19、Broadly success has been evident but not in all areas. Firstly, institutional issues relating to comprehending the various schemes and identifying implementing agencies that run the schemes have confused not only SMEs but also financial institutions. Secondly, SME is dominated by micro enterprises.
20、Demands and needs of micro enterprises may differ from small and definitely with medium enterprises. Therefore despite various efforts being introduced to enhance SMEs complaints are abound because the needs of micro enterprises have not been understood and therefore not met. For example, micro ente
21、rprises which started as cottage industries seldom have financial documentation to support their financial application and some have limited or no knowledge of the various financial schemes provided by government or financial institutions. Thirdly, the changing global environment has seen a mushroom
22、ing of of SMEs in Malaysia. The government has been developing and promoting SMEs but the results have been mixed, partly because policymakers were late in classifying the different needs and characteristics of micro, small and medium enterprises. The developments of diverse and internationally comp
23、etitive SMEs are central towards achieving sustainable economic growth. SMEs have a key role to play in the wider development agenda, especially in relation to poverty eradication and equitabledevelopment among the various ethnic groups in Malaysia.2、CGC: Issues and Problems 1. Being a public credit
24、 guarantee institution, CGC has capitalized its monopolistic position in the SME financial market. In terms of capitalization and continuous funding, BNM and the financial institutions have always backed it. Without competition, it is able to completely control the credit guarantee market. This is u
25、nhealthy, particularly in terms of an effective check and balance. 2. The usual complaints from the participating banks is that the CGC is slow to process its guarantee covers and that the guarantee fees that it charges are, on the whole, too high. This is on top of the processing fees charged by th
26、e banks and CGC (in the case of the DAGS) and the interest payments. 3. CGCs response to the above is that the guarantee fee it charges is not a burden, considering the fact that it is covering 80% of the risk as compared to the 20% risk carried by the banks. The guarantee fee is one of the sources
27、of income for CGC. CGC states that this issue needs to be corrected and resolved immediately through a negotiated policy decision. 4. Many SMEs have voiced their grievances on the long bureaucratic time for CGC to arrive at its decisions for the guarantee covers. There have been cases where document
28、s already submitted have either been misplaced or lost. On the issue of delays in processing the loans and guarantees, the CGC states that this is often due to the submission of incomplete documents and late submission of documents or information by the applicants. 5. From the CGCs perspective, this
29、 asymmetrical information is mainly due to the inexperience and an inadequate understanding by the SMEs in preparing loan documentation process. The CGC also stress that the business proposal from SMEs must be viable and based on its internal 5Cs criteria - Credit, Character, Capacity, Collateral an
30、d Condition. 6. Additionally, to improve the information flow in the application process, CGC suggests that this could be done by expanding advisory and hand-holding services. One avenue would be leveraging on the services of the SME Credit Bureau, which serves as a one-stop centre of information on
31、 SMEs. But this would take some time since the SME Credit Bureau which is owned by CGC only started operations in 2008. 7. There have also been cases where the participating banks have approved the loans (non-DAGS) of some SMEs but were finally rejected by the CGC. No concrete reasons were given for
32、 the rejections. 8. The public image of the CGC and its employees is not that good. This could be due to its complacency as a monopolistic public guarantee provider. It has rarely communicated well with the public. To this criticism, CGC mentions that it has a well-packaged on-going corporate commun
33、ication programme including road shows and media coverage, except television. 3、 Policy Discussion, Future Development of SMEs and CreditGuarantee Cooperation Broadly this study examines the current situation of the credit registries and bureaus in Malaysia, and the future prospects for their develo
34、pment; to scrutinise adequate institutional frameworks of credit information database for firms, especially SMEs; to consider a suitable regional cooperation mechanism to create a harmonised information sharing system; to review the current situation of the credit guarantee system, and identify the
35、challenges for developing the credit guarantee system. Accordingly, we have surveyed 652 SMEs and interviewed the Credit Guarantee Corporation (CGC), the SME Credit Bureau, selected commercial banks, development financial institutions and government agencies. These surveys and interviews may be subj
36、ect to various limitations, bearing in mind the time and financial constraints. Nevertheless, the policy suggestions that we put forward for consideration regarding the future development of the credit registry/ bureau and the credit guarantee system in Malaysia are aimed at enhancing and strengthen
37、ing the SMEs in Malaysia. In line with the ASEAN blueprint which encourages synergy between private and public sectors in enhancing SMEs development, commercial banks, DFIs and government agencies in Malaysia are rigorously collaborating with, guiding and financing for SMEs development. The blueprin
38、t is confirming the improvement that has been made by SMEs within a period of less than five years (this is based on DOS survey of 2003 and Bank Negara Report 2007). Nevertheless for reasons explained in this report, (Table 5.1) many SMEs are still dissatisfied with services provided to them. One ca
39、n look at this discontent from two perspectives. On the one hand government agencies, financial institutions have succeeded in educating and exposing the SME of available opportunities. Indeed some have taken the challenge even to the extent of exploring the possibility of entering the international
40、 market. On the other hand, some, due to technical and social reasons, simply cannot keep pace rapid development of SMEs. The gap is incrementally been bridged as discussed in this concluding chapter. 4、Possible Routes of Developing the CGC in Malaysia in Meeting SMEs Financing Needs It would be pos
41、sible to have another credit guarantee provider to cater for the large number of SMEs which require financing. This could be a financially sound and stable private entity with a well-established credit bureau. The rationale for this is to generate competition so that the credit guarantee companies,
42、both public and private, can provide better products and services. The goal is to strive for greater effectiveness and efficiency in the critical areas of operations, delivery systems and customer service levels. If that is not possible, then another way is to eventually turn CGC into a fully indepe
43、ndent private entity. A hint of this is already evident in CGCs transformation plan. However, this would have some major policy implications, particularly regarding ownership and control. The question is to what extent would BNM reduce its dominance in CGC, bearing in mind the political and social d
44、imensions in the larger SME framework and the total financial sector in Malaysia. The intellectual challenge would be to strike a right balance between government intervention and free enterprise. Being a partner and supporter of the SMEs and an important link between the SMEs and financial institut
45、ions, GCGs role and functions would definitely become more complex and multi-faceted. As it makes forays into new and exciting areas like securitization and equity financing and possibly other sophisticated financial instruments in the future in line with its aim to become financially sustainable, i
46、t must not lose sight on the increasing significance of micro-financing of SMEs. In the context of CGC, the range of loan size guaranteed between RM1,000 -100,000 could indicate the micro-financing. However, it is interesting to note that although the number of loans guaranteed in this bracket was t
47、he highest (2007), reported as 5,693 or 43.8% of the total, but in terms of value, it was the lowest, recording only RM282.2 million or 7.1% of the total facility. Since BNM has indicated a trend towards an expansion in micro-financing in the near future, the challenge for CGC is to improve and stre
48、ngthen its micro-financing component and to find creative and innovative ways to smoothen the risk management aspect of micro-financing. One possible solution would be to establish a subsidiary which could focus on providing an array of less cumbersome guarantee schemes to really assist the SMEs tha
49、t actually need micro- financing. Currently, the policies pertaining to the CGCs functions and roles are well in place. But in the larger SME framework in Malaysia, the CGC is also classified as a Development Financial Institution (DFI). There is no clarity about CGCs functions and responsibilities as a DFI. Can a public credit guarantee compan
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